This page summarizes how Blekline addresses common AI agent security threats at the execution boundary (Layer 4).
Assets
- Workspace policy, audit events, API keys (
blw_*) - Prompt and tool-call content transiting ingress/sidecar
- Trust Vault ciphertext (NHIM sidecar, in-VPC)
Trust boundaries
See Trust Boundaries. Summary:
- Outside perimeter: model providers, untrusted web content, user prompts
- Inside perimeter: Blekline control plane, sidecar, your VPC tool endpoints
Threats & mitigations
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Secret leakage to LLM | Local mask + cloud Azure PII; Trust Vault tokenization (NHIM) |
| Prompt injection → destructive tools | Lineage Firewall + YAML/runtime policy; simulator |
| Over-privileged tool calls | MCP tool policy, enforceToolCallLocally, sidecar enforce |
| Shadow AI agents | Ingress/sidecar at agent boundary; audit events |
| Downstream MCP impersonation | MCP identity pinning |
Browser extension surface
Enterprise deployments should treat browser extensions as high-trust surfaces. Compensating controls: workspace policy, optional MDM distribution, least-privilege workspace tokens.
Out of scope (current)
- Full CASB / network DLP replacement
- SOC 2 Type II attestation (roadmap)
- Cryptographic SPIFFE proof in OSS (roadmap — see NHIM)